DAMOCLES No. 97, June 2003
Report to the Parliament on arms transfers
A
True-False Transparency
Quietly, in mid-June, on the eve of the Air Show at Le Bourget--via the
daily economy newspaper La Tribune(1) and the Ministry internet site(2)--the
Minister of Defense made public the
Report to the Parliament on French Arms Transfers in 2001, the fourth
in this series. (See the editorial of the previous issue of Damocles).
A preliminary reading of the report shows the continuity of French policy
in this matter. Of course, the presentation of the procedures is being refined,
but, while France is the third largest arms exporter in the world, we can
only underscore once more the weakness in the political and economic reasoning
used to justify the promotion of the transfers of weapons whose proliferation
contributes to destabilization in the world and to the numerous conflicts
going on in it(3).
Despite the precautions expressed regarding internal or external conflicts,
terrorism, and the limitations on human rights, the primary motive for arms
transfers is to contribute to “the maintenance of technical and industrial
defense capacities on French territory” and to “ help to improve the quality
and contain the costs of national materiel”. This really means get other States
to help pay for the development and industrialization of weapons used by the
French armed forces...Consequently, we find in the first rank the Near and
Middle East (33.1%). This does not strike us as the best way to help stabilize
the region.
In recent years, however, the share of the European Union in the number
of orders received has increased considerably (32.5% in 2001), a consequence
of the restructuring and Europeanization going on in the arms industry. In
2001, the total of arms deliveries
was 3.1 billion euros and of orders received 3.9 billion euros. Information
published during the Bourget Air Show announces an increase in exports for
2002.
The limited scope of this article does not permit a detailed analysis of
the information provided in this fourth edition of the report to Parliament.
Among the advances in tranparency, however, we note the division of the total
deliveries for the year into the twenty-three
categories defined by the European
Un ion. This makes possible a more precise notion of the type of materiel
exported (in the 2000 report there was nothing more than a cross for the division
by category)..
For example, we can determine that the share of munitions is relatively
high: 5.4% of the deliveries for the year 2001; missiles
(not including anti-tank) also rank high: 11.25% of the 2001 deliveries.
On the other hand, since the new part of this report (notes recapitulating
exports to specific countries) has yet to be publicized on the website, we
cannot appraise its true
scope in terms of increase of transparency.
In that regard, is there such a note for Taiwan? This country is still
not identified as such in the tables for deliveries of and orders for weapons,
but it is included in a category for “others” (including countries not belonging
to the U.N.), despite being an avid customer for French weapons: it ranks
number six, according to our calculations.
But in the end, what seems most serious to us is that the lateness of the
report is damaging to the exercise of true democratic control at grips with
reality. Indeed, as the reporters of the task force on the control of weapons
exports had hoped(4), the publication of the report for the year 2000 had
enabled the Defense Committee of the National Assembly to organize hearings
with NGOs and industrialists and then a debate with the Minister of Defense
in January 2002. The idea had even been suggested then to hold the hearings
and the debate on the 2001 report jointly with the Committees of Defense and
Foreign Affairs. The publication of the 2001 report on the eve of the Parliamentary
vacation compromises the organization of such a follow-up on governmental
policy.
Moreover, the report would gain in transparency if it were published not
only under the signature of the Minister of Defense but had integrated into
it the position and the role of other entities participating in the control
of exports, such as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance and the offices
of the Prime Minister. Additionally, the absence of a “Conclusion” in the
2001 report makes it impossible to know the perspectives of the government
concerning exports, which leads one to think that, far from a policy of prudence
and non-proliferation, France is really attempting to reinforce her share
of the market (consider the recent trips of Mr. Raffarin and Mrs Alliot-Marie
to India, for example), with all the consequences for peoples who are victims
of the numerous bloody conflicts in the world.
Patrice Bouveret
1. La Tribune,June 11, 2003
2. www.defense.gouv.fr. The annexes, and notably the individual notes by
country, have
not yet been published on the
Internet. Bidding for the printing of the report has just begun; thus the
paper version will probably not be available until September!
3. See the special; issue of Damocles, “ Weapons transfers of the
European Union:
inadequate control”, No. 95,
36 pp., 6 Euros.
4. Sandrier, Jean-Claude, Christian Martin, & Alain Veyret, Control
of Armaments
Exports, Defense Committee,
information documents of the National Assembly, no.
2334, April 25, 2000.
A Second French Aircraft Carrier
According to the military authorization
law for 2003-2008, a second aircraft carrier is to be ordered in 2005, to
go into active service in 2015. The type of propulsion is still an open question:
nuclear or petroleum? The General Delegation for Armament (DGA) is supposed
to present its conclusions this month to Michele Alliot-Marie who “set the
summer or the beginning of the fall for a decision”, according to an announcement
made by Jean-Francois Bureau, the spokesperson for the Minister of Defense(1).
Beginning in 1954, France aspired to raise herself to the status of a great
international power. This has been an accomplished fact since her sole nuclear
aircraft carrier (PAN) went into service on May 18, 2001! Thus, the navy now
possesses an entire panoply, with four missile-launching nuclear subs (two
of them of the “new generation”), six nuclear attack subs, and the famous
Charles-de-Gaulle.
So, after having hoisted herself (despite
numerous technical problems) onto the third step of countries possessing nuclear-powered
surface warships, France thought that it would be appropriate to have two
aircraft carriers, not just one. In fact, such a ship is necessarily unavailable
for certain periods because of the type of propulsion. In 2006, the cores
of two K15 nuclear reactors will be reloaded; then in 2015, the Charles-de-Gaulle
will be out of operation for almost a year during reconditioning of the
hull.
Unquestioningly, the Navy praises nuclear propulsion for the independence
from fuel re-supply it provides, for its strategic mobility, and for the reliability
of the reactors. Such is this admiration that Vice-Admiral Francois Cluzel
would like to “equip all ocean vessels” with nuclear energy and “to sign a
contract [for the construction of a new one] without delay(2).”
However, if advantages and disadvantages are tallied to make the right
choice, there is danger, as in everything concerning the sensitive nuclear
question, that certain data will not
be presented, in order to favor the all-nuclear:
--cost: even though it may be less than that of its predecessor
(estimated nonetheless at 3.011 billion euros(3)), because of more know-how,
future costs must inevitably be added for dismantling the reactors, management
of nuclear waste from the maintenance of the reactors, stocking of exhausted
fuel, and finally for the certain cost to future generations;
--the logic of the project: Thales is going to participate as a
partner with BAe Systems in the construction of two British carriers. Has
the U.K., an essentially naval power, decided not to possess independence,
strategic mobility, and tactical flexibility by choosing conventional propulsion?
And why not take advantage of the expertise of Thales, which takes
account of recent technical data (the first studies for the Charles-de-Gaulle
go back to 1986)?
--usefulness: of what use is it to have a nuclear aircraft carrier
if its only mission is to fill in during the down time of the Charles-de-Gaulle?
In fact, the future French carrier will be a “phantom ship”, lacking
all aerial components; “it would be necessary also to double the number of
active aircraft, a fine ambition, impossible to realize(4).”
--dismantling: even if this question is less dramatic than in Russia,
it is still true that no solution has been found. Thus, at present, a missile-launching
submarine reactor that is dismantled is stocked in the open air at Cherbourg
for fifteen years, while its un-reprocessed fuel is stored on the Cadarache
site pending completion of the future deep storage site for long-life, highly
active waste. This general outline will be the same for all future nuclear
propulsion reactors.
Nuclear or conventional propulsion? The answer will arrive in the month
of October 2003. Meanwhile, the report of the parliamentary task force on
the mode of propulsion for future aircraft carriers will be presented. Will
it take account of the questions raised above?
Jean-Marie Collin
1. According to a dispatch dated June 19, 2003, available at the website
www.ixarm.com
2. Francois Cluzel, “A Sister Ship for the Charles-de-Gaulle?”.
Defense nationale, no. 427,
April 2003.
3. Xavier de Villepin, Rapport, Senate, no. 427, June 12, 1996,
p. 145.
4. Francois Cluzel, “A Sister Ship...”
